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<article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.1d1" xml:lang="en"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher">Medical Scientific Bulletin of Central Chernozemye (Naučno-medicinskij vestnik Centralʹnogo Černozemʹâ)</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title>Medical Scientific Bulletin of Central Chernozemye (Naučno-medicinskij vestnik Centralʹnogo Černozemʹâ)</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn publication-format="electronic">1990-472X</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Федеральное государственное бюджетное образовательное учреждение высшего образования "Воронежский государственный медицинский университет имени Н.Н. Бурденко" Министерства здравоохранения Российской Федерации</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">4842</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18499/1990-472X-2016-0-63-3-5</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Original Article</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>CONCEIVABILITY AS PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT, AND HIS EXPLANATORY POTENTIAL</article-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author"><name name-style="western"><surname>Belyaev</surname><given-names>M A</given-names></name><bio></bio><email>yurist84@inbox.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff id="aff-1">Voronezh State University</aff><pub-date date-type="epub" iso-8601-date="2016-12-15" publication-format="electronic"><day>15</day><month>12</month><year>2016</year></pub-date><issue>63</issue><fpage>3</fpage><lpage>5</lpage><history><pub-date date-type="received" iso-8601-date="2020-04-25"><day>25</day><month>04</month><year>2020</year></pub-date></history><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright © 2016, Научно-медицинский вестник Центрального Черноземья</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2016</copyright-year></permissions><abstract>The article shows that the conceivability argument widely used in contemporary philosophy of mind and metaphysics, does not allow to make the final choice between competing theories, each of these is logically equal any other. This is because the conceivability argument is symmetric with respect to the terms that contradicted or confirmed using thought experiment. The author hypothesized that distinguishing logical and metaphysical possibilities may destroy this symmetry.</abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>сознание</kwd><kwd>мыслимость</kwd><kwd>мысленный эксперимент</kwd><kwd>метафизическая возможность</kwd><kwd>Д. Чалмерс</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><body></body><back><ref-list><ref id="B1"><label>1.</label><mixed-citation>1.Sorensen, R. Thought experiments / Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="B2"><label>2.</label><mixed-citation>2. Chalmers, David J. Does conceivability entail possibility? / In Tamar S. Gendler &amp; John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press, pp. 145 - 200 (2002).</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="B3"><label>3.</label><mixed-citation>3. Чалмерс Д. Сознающий ум: В поисках фундаментальной теории. Пер. с англ. / М.: УРСС : Книжный дом «ЛИБРОКОМ», 2013. - 512 с.</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="B4"><label>4.</label><mixed-citation>4. Иванов Д.В. Феноменальная природа сознания (проблема натуралистического объяснения сознания): дисс. … д. филос. н. / Д. В. Иванов. - Москва, 2015. - 309 с.</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="B5"><label>5.</label><mixed-citation>5. Kirk, R. Zombies v. Materialists // Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1974. Supp. Vol. 48, pp. 135 - 163.</mixed-citation></ref></ref-list></back></article>
